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Icarus is a character in Greek mythology whose arrogance led 
him to ignore the warnings of his father, Daedalus, and fly 
higher than he should with the wings he built from feathers and 
wax.  When he flew too close to the sun, the wax holding his 
wings together melted, causing Icarus to fall to earth and drown.  
The lessons about the pitfalls of Icarus’ arrogance are relevant to 
the climate change debate.  The growing public concern over the 
issue may signal a recognition of past and present arrogance, and 
the myriad legal developments in both courts and legislatures 
can be seen as an attempt to warn us against getting too close to 
the sun.  The purpose of this Article is to give an overview of 
legal developments on the federal level, and at the same time 
show that efforts at the state level may do the most to keep us 
from drowning. 
Climate change is viewed by many as a global environmental 
catastrophe close to the “tipping point,” while others see climate 
change as an alarmist prediction based on suspect science.  Truth 
is rarely found in the extremes.  Assuming that we should 
believe the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
environmental crisis is apparently imminent.  In his address on 
the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007),1 United Nations 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated: 
I come to you humbled after seeing some of the most precious 
treasures of our planet–treasures that are being threatened by 
humanity’s own hand. 
. . . . 
Slowing–and reversing–these threats are the defining 
challenge of our age.  The world looks to our climate brain 
trust to educate, inform and guide us.2 
Our United States Supreme Court, or at least a 5-4 majority of 
the Justices, apparently agrees with the IPCC’s science.  In 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Court helped set in motion a more vigorous approach at all 
 
1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. 
2 Ban Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen., United Nations, Address to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Nov. 17, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/apps/ 
sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2869. 
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levels of government to address climate change.3  Much has 
already been written about Massachusetts, particularly in the 
areas of standing and the Court’s conclusion that carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” under the Clean 
Air Act (CAA).4  Massachusetts is arguably the Supreme Court’s 
most important environmental case in recent years, although its 
significance lies not simply in what the Court said about standing 
and greenhouse gases, but where those holdings will ultimately 
take us in attempting to address climate change in the time we 
have left.5 
The scope of this Article is not merely to “rediscover” what 
the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts, but rather to examine 
where the case takes us in furtherance of comprehensive, 
economy-wide greenhouse gas solutions, particularly at the 
regional and state levels.  Clearly, at least a bare majority of the 
Justices recognized that climate change, and specifically the 
greenhouse gases contributing to climate change, present the 
most pressing environmental challenge of our time.6  Ultimately, 
the recognition by the judiciary that something as ever-present 
as CO2 might actually be an air pollutant has set in motion a 
dialogue aimed at moving beyond piecemeal regulation and 
towards economy-wide climate change solutions. 
Although not necessarily as a result of Massachusetts, but 
significant nevertheless, Congress is responding to the global 
 
3 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
4 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the 
Institutional Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 196 (2008), 
http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2008/02/balancing-manda.html; Hari M. 
Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II: Narratives of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 573 (2008); Jonathan Z. Cannon, The 
Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV.  In Brief 53 (2007), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cannon.pdf; Arnold W. Reitze, 
Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Mobile Sources–Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,535 (2007); Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate 
Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. In Brief 63 (2007), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf. 
5 Consider the timeframe involved in the final adjudication of Massachusetts.  
The petitioners originally filed a rulemaking petition asking the EPA to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in 1999.  Massachusetts, 127 S. 
Ct. at 1449.  Ultimately, the case took almost eight years before the Supreme Court 
decided it in 2007. 
6 Id. at 1446. 
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climate change issue with federal legislation.7  Meanwhile, the 
EPA and other federal agencies are now obligated to grapple 
with greenhouse gas issues and can no longer rely on the 
purported “uncertainty” surrounding them.8  Although 
Massachusetts arose in the context of regulation of mobile 
sources,9 the federal government ultimately will be obligated to 
turn to stationary sources, as further explained in this Article.10 
At the same time, various regulatory programs to address 
climate change are being developed at the regional, state, and 
local levels.  The inevitable interplay between federal and state 
regulation of greenhouse gases will certainly raise substantive 
legal conflicts, particularly in the areas of federal supremacy, 
preemption, and Dormant Commerce Clause issues.  The 
resulting legislative, regulatory, and judicial processes will take a 
long time to play out and time may not be a luxury we can 
afford. 
It is ironic, and perhaps distressing, that Massachusetts was 
decided a decade after the Kyoto Protocol,11 in which most of the 
world’s nations joined in the international effort to address 
climate change.  The United States declined and still struggles to 
implement meaningful solutions.12  At the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference held in Bali in December 2007, the 
contentious two-week meeting concluded on a slightly optimistic 
note with the United States, facing criticism from other nations’ 
delegations, finally relenting in its opposition to programs to 
 
7 Numerous climate change bills were introduced in the 110th Congress, 
including an ambitious proposal by Senator McCain that seeks to create a cap-and-
trade scheme.  Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. 
(2007).  As proposed, Senate Bill 280 would cap emissions levels in certain business 
sectors at 2000 emission levels and would achieve the goal through a cap-and-trade 
emissions scheme.  Id. 
8 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463. 
9 Id. 
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2006) (defining “stationary sources” under the 
Clean Air Act as “any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may 
emit any air pollutant.”). 
11 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 26 (1998). 
12 INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENVTL. RESEARCH & LAWYERS’ COMM. ON 
NUCLEAR POLICY, RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?  AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. 
POLICIES AND ACTIONS REGARDING SECURITY-RELATED TREATIES 111–14 
(Nicole Deller et al. eds., 2003). 
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provide more technological assistance to developing nations.13  
Still, the Bali Action Plan produced by the Conference 
ultimately does not commit countries to specific climate change 
actions, but merely sets an agenda and schedule for further 
initiatives, and facilitates assistance for developing nations in 
terms of technology and financial assistance.14  It is becoming 
increasingly imperative that the United States play a stronger 
role in addressing climate change. 
If we accept the science and believe the United Nations’ IPCC 
and our own Supreme Court, then we must accelerate our efforts 
as a nation towards reducing the risks of global climate change.  
Unfortunately, our legislative, legal, and judicial processes are 
not designed for this kind of expedited decision making, 
especially when an effective, “global” solution implicates 
regulation across the entire economy.15  Meaningful solutions 
would balance the competing environmental and economic 
concerns over climate change, and with the powers behind these 
interests, that will take much time to effectively implement.  
Implementation would require complex program development, 
legislation, rulemaking, and litigation.  Ultimately, it will likely  
be years or possibly decades before comprehensive, economy-
wide environmental programs are in place on the national level 
that effectuate substantive reductions to the risks of climate 
change.  To the extent that federal climate change initiatives 
continue to be limited to voluntary programs such as tax 
incentives, the efforts may be ineffective in the absence of more 
vigorous regulatory programs and mandates.16 
 
13 Joseph Coleman, Bali Climate Change Talks Reach Agreement, 
WTOPNEWS.COM, Dec. 15, 2007, http://www.wtopnews.com/?nid=220&pid=0&sid= 
1302463&page=1. 
14 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali Action Plan, 
Decision  
-/CP.13 (2007) (advance unedited version), available at http://unfccc.int/ 
files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf. 
15 From the authors’ experience, the timeframes involved in any significant 
environmental issue, in combination with administrative agency decision making, 
followed by trial court litigation over that decision making, followed by further 
appellate litigation, to reach the point of a final adjudication, ultimately takes years, 
not months, to complete.  Five years is, perhaps, wishful thinking.  Consider, for 
example, the decade it took simply to fully adjudicate Massachusetts v. EPA. 
16 Most, if not all, of the climate change initiatives implemented by the 
Administration through the EPA are voluntary initiatives.  See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, Climate Change–U.S. Climate Policy, Current and Near-Term  
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More optimistically, the prospect of comprehensive federal, 
state, and regional approaches to climate change is not hopeless.  
The ultimate focus of this Article is an examination of the 
complex interplay between the existing federal and state 
regulatory programs available to address climate change and the 
legal issues inherent in that interplay.  There are already 
numerous examples of effective federal and state co-regulation 
of environmental matters across the board in the areas of air, 
water, and solid/hazardous waste regulation.17  There is no 
reason to assume climate change cannot be addressed similarly.   
This Article first addresses the ultimate impact of 
Massachusetts in the context of the law of climate change in the 
United States.  We analyze the immediate implications of 
probable regulatory actions at the federal level which are either 
mandated by Massachusetts or will likely follow as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s decision.  The Article then considers the 
existing regional and state climate protection efforts evolving 
independently of federal climate change initiatives.  We argue 
that these “sub-national” initiatives are evolving in a “federal 
vacuum.”18  As a case study of sub-national climate change 
initiatives evolving in the federal vacuum, California’s pioneer 
programs are looked to as an important economy-wide program 
that may also play a key role in furthering notions of 
environmental federalism.  In light of the evolution of programs 
like those in California, this Article considers the potential 
federal and state conflicts that may arise as a result of regional, 
 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Initiatives, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/policy/neartermghgreduction.html (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2008). 
17 For example, the effective co-regulation of federal and state air law is 
discussed more fully below.  Similarly, the federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251–1387 (2006); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006); and the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006) all have 
comparable state counterparts. 
18 “Subnational” refers to both regional and state policy such as the Northeastern 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.  See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: An 
Initiative of the Northeast & Mid-Atlantic States of the U.S.; California Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 
(West 2006); Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), http://www.rggi.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2008) [hereinafter RGGI].  The term federal vacuum is a term 
used to describe the delay inherent in implementing comprehensive federal climate 
change policy. 
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state, and local climate change initiatives.  Finally, the Article 
considers goals of environmental federalism, wherein 
preemption is limited and both federal and sub-national 
coordination of policy is maximized.  By viewing the states as 
laboratories for effective policy, this conception of 
environmental federalism would further national reductions in 
greenhouse gases through the encouragement of sub-national 
efforts. 
I 
MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA: THE NEW SOLICITUDE FOR STATE 
ACTION 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the state of Massachusetts and other 
petitioners brought an action challenging EPA’s refusal to 
regulate motor-vehicle emissions allegedly contributing to 
climate change.19  The EPA argued that the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) did not authorize it to address climate change and that 
executive policy specifically addressing climate change 
warranted EPA’s refusal to regulate vehicular emissions.20  The 
Supreme Court disagreed.21 
Essentially, the Supreme Court initially held that the 
petitioners had standing to challenge EPA’s denial of their 
rulemaking petition since at least one of the petitioners 
(Massachusetts) had asserted a concrete injury essential for 
standing.22  Once the Court found standing, it analyzed the 
applicable CAA provisions and held that, because greenhouse 
gases are clearly within the CAA’s broad definition of an air 
pollutant, the EPA has the statutory authority to regulate the 
 
19 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).  The list of 
petitioners was extensive, including twelve states, the District of Columbia, 
American Samoa, New York City, Baltimore, and a number of private 
organizations.  Id. at 1446 nn.2–4. 
20 See id. at 1450. 
21 Id. at 1463. 
22 Id. at 1456.  “Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the 
state’s coastal property it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a 
landowner.  The severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next 
century . . . .”  Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).  The Court concluded: 
“With that in mind, it is clear that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to 
Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial 
process.”  Id. at 1455. 
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emissions of such gases from new motor vehicles.23  Significantly, 
the Supreme Court further held that, because it is undisputed 
that climate change threatens serious environmental harm, 
policy considerations are irrelevant to EPA’s statutory mandate 
under the CAA to determine whether greenhouse gases 
contribute to climate change and whether motor vehicle 
emissions of such gases actually or potentially endanger public 
health or welfare.24 
With regard to the issue of standing in Massachusetts, some 
scholars have viewed the Supreme Court’s approach to standing 
as “somewhat unusual.”25  Interestingly, the Supreme Court 
observed that “[w]hen a State enters the Union, it surrenders 
certain sovereign prerogatives,” but obtains “a concomitant 
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking 
petition as arbitrary and capricious.”26  Moreover, the Court 
concluded, “[g]iven that procedural right and Massachusetts’ 
stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the 
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing 
analysis.”27 
The implication of the Supreme Court’s holding regarding 
Massachusetts’ basis for standing and “special solicitude,” and 
by extension to other states and possible parties, is the potential 
for new state and local efforts to compel the regulation of 
environmental programs and policies through the courts in areas 
previously regarded as beyond judicial inquiry.28  In that regard, 
it is particularly noteworthy that the Court recognized a 
fundamental distinction between an administrative agency’s 
discretion to initiate enforcement actions, as compared to its 
 
23 Id. at 1459–60. 
24 Id. at 1455, 1460. 
25 Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking 
New Ground on Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 1, 2 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/17/index.html. 
26 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454. 
27 Id. at 1454–55. 
28 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy 
No Less than Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors Watts and Wildermuth, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 32 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
lawreview/colloquy/2007/20/index.html (broadly discussing the implications of 
standing). 
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discretion to adopt–or not adopt–regulations.  The Court 
stated: 
As we have repeated time and again, an agency has broad 
discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources 
and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities.  That 
discretion is at its height when the agency decides not to bring 
an enforcement action . . . . 
 There are key differences between a denial of a petition for 
rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an 
enforcement action.  In contrast to nonenforcement decisions, 
agency refusals to initiate rulemaking are less frequent, more 
apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject 
to special formalities, including a public explanation.  They 
moreover arise out of denials of petitions for rulemaking which 
(at least in the circumstances here) the affected party had an 
undoubted procedural right to file in the first instance.  
Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial 
review, though such review is extremely limited and highly 
deferential.29 
The Supreme Court’s holding regarding standing based on 
“special solicitude” is especially interesting in the context of its 
potential to provide a judicial basis to compel agency regulation 
where a court concludes that an agency possesses a legislative 
mandate to act, but is otherwise refusing to act.  In essence, 
although one could reasonably have expected the Court to accord 
some deference to EPA’s position relative to greenhouse gas 
regulations,30 the Court nevertheless was willing to effectively look 
beyond the possible political motivation for that decision and 
override EPA’s administrative decision.31 
On the other hand, the implications of the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of CO2 and other greenhouse gases as air pollutants 
are even more significant.  Delivering the opinion of the Court in 
recognizing the science of the IPCC and other climate change 
scientists, Justice Stevens observed: 
[A] well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided 
with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere.  Respected scientists believe the 
two trends are related.  For when carbon dioxide is released 
into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, 
trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected 
 
29 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
30 See, e.g., id. at 1474–75 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
31 See id. at 1462–63. 
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heat.  It is therefore a species–the most important species–of 
a “greenhouse gas.”32 
Basing its decision on the “sweeping definition” of “air 
pollutant” in the CAA,33 the Supreme Court concluded: 
On its face, the definition embraces all airborne compounds of 
whatever stripe, and underscores that intent through the 
repeated use of the word “any.”  Carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt 
physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] emitted 
into . . . the ambient air.  The statute is unambiguous.34 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the EPA had 
“offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide 
whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate 
change,” and, therefore, its refusal to regulate was “arbitrary, 
capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.”35  
Although the Court did not expressly obligate the EPA to 
determine through rulemaking that CO2 and other greenhouse 
gases are air pollutants,36 as a practical matter, the Court did just 
that.  In view of EPA’s positions to date in the context of 
greenhouse gases, coupled with its argument before the Supreme 
Court to the effect that the EPA recognized the effects of 
greenhouse gases but was unable to regulate them, the Supreme 
Court essentially “boxed” the EPA into the ultimate 
determination that CO2 and greenhouse gases are air pollutants 
within the meaning of the CAA and, therefore, must be 
regulated, at least as to vehicular emissions.37 
Beyond the legal implications of Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court’s decision also can be understood in terms of an emerging 
judicial view of the implications of what some authors have 
referred to as “expertise-forcing,” “politicized expertise,” and 
 
32 Id. at 1446. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006). 
34 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1460 (internal quotation omitted). 
35 Id. at 1463. 
36 Id. The majority opinion concludes with the statement: 
We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must 
make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can inform 
EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding.  We hold only that 
EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
37 See id. at 1459–60. 
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“the anti-circumvention principle.”38  “Expertise-forcing” has 
been defined as “the attempt by courts to ensure that agencies 
exercise expert judgment free from outside political pressures, 
even or especially political pressures emanating from the White 
House or political appointees in the agencies.”39  “Politicized 
expertise” is the perceived problem of political interference with 
agency expertise.40  The “anti-circumvention principle” assumes 
that the courts should interpret statutes and regulations in a 
manner which prevents the circumvention of the provisions of 
the statutes.41  Massachusetts reflects an implicit suspicion of 
politics, at least as to climate change, to the extent that the Court 
essentially forced expertise in order to prevent the 
circumvention of the regulatory rulemaking that the Court 
concluded was required by the CAA.42  Ultimately, the judiciary 
may be more inclined in the future to substitute its judgment for 
perceived agency inaction in the face of an arguable statutory 
mandate.  The implication of that prospect in light of the 
separation of powers doctrine is significant, but beyond 
discussion here. 
Another interesting concept that helps explain Massachusetts 
is the “scientizing of politics,” an interference with agency 
expertise.43  Professor Hari Osofsky describes the issue in terms 
of “scale, science, and law.”44  Viewed through this lens, the 
Supreme Court’s skepticism regarding the reluctance of the EPA 
to regulate greenhouse gases perhaps is based on the Bush 
administration’s use of science defensively, e.g., “high burden of 
proof, value choices in the face of ambiguity, resolution of 
 
38 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/freeman/vermeule.freeman.paper.pdf 
(discussing the political “expertise-forcing” issues attendant in administrative 
decision-making). 
39 Id. (manuscript at 1–2). 
40 See id. (manuscript at 3). 
41 Id. (manuscript at 25). 
42 Id. (manuscript at 29–31). 
43 Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4, on file with 
authors). 
44 Id. (manuscript at 7). 
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scientific certainty issues at the agency level, and limits to 
information gathering.”45 
The Supreme Court in Massachusetts gave great weight to 
IPCC’s climate change science.46  To the extent that courts may 
be more inclined to embark on independent judicial inquiry, the 
emerging role of the judiciary independently evaluating the 
“weight” of scientific and other expert evidence was, perhaps, 
foreshadowed by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.47  
Prior to Daubert, courts relied on two standards for determining 
the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) relevance, i.e., whether 
the evidence addresses a fact at issue in the case and would be 
helpful to the trier of fact; and (2) whether the methods used by 
the expert in forming scientific conclusions are generally 
accepted within the expert community.48 Daubert established a 
new standard for the admissibility of expert evidence, which 
effectively makes judges the gatekeepers of expert evidence by 
requiring the court to examine the scientific method underlying 
the expert evidence and admitting only that evidence which is 
both relevant and reliable.49  The ultimate effect is a form of 
judicial autonomy for determining relevant and reliable expert 
evidence.50 
The Supreme Court’s apparent willingness to substitute 
judicial judgment and force expertise is not merely limited to 
expert science.  For example, in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, the 
Supreme Court substituted its judgment for a rule of golf 
adopted by the Professional Golf Association (PGA) in a case 
involving the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).51  
The case addressed the right of access to professional golf 
tournaments by a qualified professional golfer with a disability, 
and more importantly, whether that disabled golfer could be 
denied the use of a golf cart because it would “fundamentally 
alter the nature” of the tournaments to allow the golfer to ride 
 
45 Id. (manuscript at 4). 
46 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1448–49 (2007). 
47 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
48 Id. at 588–89. 
49 Id. at 589. 
50 Id. 
51 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001). 
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when all other contestants must walk.52  The Supreme Court 
disregarded the PGA’s justification for the so-called “walking 
rule,” and imposed its own more tolerant and progressive 
judgment on the rules of the game as established by the PGA.53  
In the words of the Court, “[T]he walking rule is at best 
peripheral to the nature of petitioner’s athletic events, and thus 
it might be waived in individual cases without working a 
fundamental alteration.”54  The extent of the Court’s reach in 
terms of substituting its judgment for that of the PGA was 
criticized by Justice Scalia in dissent: 
If one assumes, however, that the PGA TOUR has some legal 
obligation to play classic, Platonic golf–and if one assumes the 
correctness of all the other wrong turns the Court has made to 
get to this point–then we Justices must confront what is 
indeed an awesome responsibility.  It has been rendered the 
solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United States, laid 
upon it by Congress in pursuance of the Federal Government’s 
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States,” to decide What Is Golf.55 
In the context of climate change, ultimately, the Supreme 
Court used EPA’s reluctance, or refusal, to substitute its own 
judgment to direct the regulation of greenhouse gases in the 
context of what the Court perceived as a clear legislative 
mandate.56  The Court effectively compelled regulatory action 
regarding something as ubiquitous as CO2 as an “air pollutant” 
to be controlled in the context of the broader environmental 
problem of climate change.  In a sense, the Court’s decision 
forces EPA to address climate change more seriously and gives 
significant credence and momentum to state and regional efforts 
to address climate change in the existing vacuum resulting from 
federal inaction. 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 689. 
55 Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
56 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460–61 (2007). 
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II 
IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
A number of bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress 
to address climate change.57  The various pending climate change 
bills, as well as those likely to be introduced in the near future, 
can generally be divided into two broad categories: 
command/control and market-based incentives.58  A command 
and control policy exists when the government tells a source to 
unconditionally reduce its emissions, or mandates the use of a 
technology or process.59  On the other hand, market-based 
incentives, such as cap-and-trade and carbon taxes are a more 
flexible approach because they allow a source to change its 
emissions level when it is cost effective to do so.60  Under this 
approach, a government can use the market to encourage the 
retirement of carbon-heavy sources by making the price of 
carbon use more expensive rather than demanding the 
 
57 See, e.g., Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (introduced by Senators Lieberman and McCain; proposing mandatory CO2 
caps on government and private facilities that emit 10,000 tons or more of CO2 per 
year); Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced 
by Senators Bingaman and Specter; proposing mandatory CO2 caps on oil and gas 
companies); Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(introduced by Senators Feinstein and Carper; proposing mandatory CO2 caps on 
all electricity-generating entities of 25 megawatts or greater); Climate Stewardship 
Act of 2007, H.R. 620, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Representatives Olver 
and Gilchrest; proposing mandatory greenhouse gas caps on all facilities 
(government and private) that emit 10,000 tons of CO2 per year, including 
petroleum refineries and importers); Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (introduced by Representatives Waxman and Allen; proposing 
mandatory greenhouse gas caps on those sectors of the economy with the largest 
emissions and best opportunities to reduce emissions); Global Warming Reduction 
Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Senators Kerry and Snowe; 
proposing mandatory greenhouse gas caps on sources or sectors with the greatest 
greenhouse gas emissions as determined by the EPA); Global Warming Pollution 
Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Senators Sanders and 
Boxer; proposing greenhouse gas caps on regulated entities to be determined by the 
EPA); see also Environmental Defense Fund, Climate Change Bills of the 110th 
Congress, http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=1075 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
58 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument 
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 705, 710 (1999). 
59 Id. at 706. 
60 Id. at 709. 
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curtailment of greenhouse gases.  Some of the bills are hybrids 
and include elements of both categories.61 
Traditional regulatory measures have included aspects of both 
command/control and market-based incentives.62  While there 
are many examples of existing federal laws that address climate 
change, proponents of economy-wide climate change policies 
generally argue that carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, or some 
combination of the two are needed to effectively reduce the risks 
associated with climate change.63 
There are numerous climate change bills that have been 
proposed in the 110th Congress, many of which would create a 
comprehensive, economy-wide scheme for regulating 
greenhouse gases.64  At this point, a prediction of where 
Congress will end up regulating climate change in the future is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  However, it is at least apparent 
that Massachusetts is a call for a greater legislative concern about 
the problem of climate change.  Whether that concern will 
ultimately translate into effective federal programs is yet to be 
seen.  To be sure, Congress has in the past acted quickly to 
exercise its legislative powers, particularly in times of national 
 
61 See, e.g., America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(proposing to establish an emissions cap-and-trade system and to impose efficiency 
standards for residential buildings); see also Environmental Defense Fund, supra 
note 57. 
62 For example, an existing command/control policy is the Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy standards.  Wiener, supra note 58, at 706.  Additionally, market-
based incentives are provided for in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which creates 
numerous individual and business tax credits for investing in hybrid-electric vehicles 
and energy efficient appliances.  See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, The Energy Policy Act 
of 2005: What the Energy Bill Means to You, http://www.energy.gov/taxbreaks.htm 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2008). 
63 For an example of the extensive scholarly debate over the pros and cons of 
carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade programs, see Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. 
Wilcoxen, The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy, 16 J. ECON. PERSP., 
107, 107–29 (2002).  The merits to either side of the debate is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
64 See, e.g., Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (introduced by Senators Lieberman and McCain; proposing mandatory CO2 
caps on government and private facilities that emit 10,000 tons or more of CO2 per 
year); Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2006) (introduced 
by Senators Bingaman and Specter; proposing mandatory CO2 caps on oil and gas 
companies). 
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emergency.65  Whether Congress can respond expeditiously and 
effectively enough to address the climate change problem on a 
truly national level is another question altogether. 
Massachusetts has had impacts beyond the level of 
Congressional legislation.  Indeed, shortly after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in April 2007, President Bush signed an 
Executive Order directing the EPA to develop regulations to 
respond to the Supreme Court’s decision, to use EPA’s existing 
authority under the CAA to implement a so-called “twenty-in-
ten” proposal as a framework for the regulations, and to work 
together with other agencies to develop the regulations.66  
Consequently, section 202 of the CAA will likely obligate the 
EPA to make the requisite “endangerment finding” and set new-
vehicle emission standards.  The focus of the endangerment 
finding will be air pollutants that the EPA Administrator 
concludes cause or contribute to air pollution, specifically CO2 
and other greenhouse gases.67  The President’s Executive Order 
directing the EPA to develop regulations in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision makes the ultimate result of regulating 
at least vehicular emissions a foregone conclusion.  As 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts: 
If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act 
requires the agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious 
pollutant from new motor vehicles.  EPA no doubt has 
significant latitude as to the manner, timing, content, and 
coordination of its regulations with those of other agencies.  
But once EPA has responded to a petition for rulemaking, its 
reasons for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing 
statute.  Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can 
avoid taking further action only if it determines that 
greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it 
provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or 
will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.  
To the extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue 
 
65 Consider, for example, the rapid response by Congress in enacting the Patriot 
Act after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  The Patriot Act was signed 
into law on October 26, 2001.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot 
Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
66 Exec. Order No. 13,432, 72 Fed. Reg. 27,717 (May 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070514-1.html. 
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
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other priorities of the Administrator or the President, this is 
the congressional design.68 
The EPA has made its intentions clear after Massachusetts.  
The Agency is pursuing a greenhouse gas rule that will focus on 
making the requisite endangerment findings that greenhouse 
gases contribute to air pollution, which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.  The 
endangerment finding will necessitate vehicle regulations for 
greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks.69  The finding 
will also require fuel regulations designed to set controls on fuels 
to reduce emissions of air pollutants that endanger public health 
and welfare.70 
Assuming the EPA makes the required endangerment finding 
under section 202 of the CAA, it may be simply a matter of time 
before the Agency is compelled to adopt additional greenhouse 
gas regulations under other CAA provisions for sources other 
than vehicles.  For example, section 111 of the CAA requires the 
EPA to set emission performance standards for any stationary 
source that “causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or welfare.”71  To the extent the greenhouse gases meet the 
similar endangerment requirement of section 202 of the CAA 
for vehicular sources, it is predictable that they will also meet the 
endangerment requirement of section 111.  Section 111 regulates 
stationary sources, which the Act defines as “any building, 
structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air 
pollutant.”72  Consequently, the regulatory actions of the EPA 
with regard to vehicular sources can reasonably be anticipated to 
ultimately extend to non-vehicular or stationary sources. 
 
68 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007) (internal 
citations omitted). 
69 The promulgation of a new regulation by the EPA dealing with greenhouse gas 
emissions from two specific mobile sources is still in the “workshop” stage as of the 
writing of this Article.  However, based on EPA’s presentations to date, the 
regulation is all but inevitable.  See Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, Testimony Before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and 
Global Warming, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ocirpage/hearings/testimony/110_2007_2008/2008_0313_slj.pdf. 
70 Id. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A). 
72 Id. § 7411(a)(3). 
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By logical extension, section 108 of the CAA may also come 
into play.  Section 108 provides that the EPA Administrator 
shall publish a list of emissions that “cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”73  Once a pollutant is listed under 
CAA section 108, the EPA is then required to develop a criteria 
document consistent with section 109 of the CAA and establish 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for the 
particular pollutant.74  Upon establishment of the standard for 
the pollutant under the NAAQS, CAA section 110 then requires 
the individual states to submit State Implementation Plans 
(SIPs) to provide for the implementation, maintenance, and 
enforcement of the ambient air quality standard.75 
Under the CAA, the states and their subdivisions already 
have considerable authority to regulate in the field of climate 
change on their own.  CAA section 102 encourages cooperative 
activities by state and local governments for the prevention and 
control of air pollution.76  CAA section 116 provides that nothing 
in the Act shall preclude or deny the rights of states or their 
political subdivisions to adopt standards, limitations, or 
requirements regarding control or abatement of air pollution as 
long as they are not “less stringent” than federal requirements.77  
CAA section 131 provides that nothing in the Act shall infringe 
on the authority of counties and cities to plan or control land 
use.78  Interestingly, CAA section 115 even requires the EPA 
Administrator to notify the governors of the states and follow 
other prescribed actions whenever the Administrator has 
received “reports, surveys or studies” from any duly constituted 
international agency that indicate that air pollution from the 
United States is endangering the public health or welfare of a 
foreign country.79  In view of the IPCC Report previously 
discussed, the EPA may already be obligated to proceed more 
 
73 Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A). 
74 Id. § 7409(a)(1)(A). 
75 Id. § 7410. 
76 Id. § 7402(a). 
77 Id. § 7416. 
78 Id. § 7431. The potential land use implications of climate change are touched 
on later in this Article. 
79 Id. § 7415(a). 
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expeditiously than merely addressing greenhouse gases in the 
context of CAA section 102. 
In theory at least, and by operation of the provisions of the 
CAA, the states and their subdivisions will ultimately be 
required to regulate air pollutants reasonably anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare, specifically including 
stationary sources within the jurisdiction of the states and local 
governments.  In reality, many of the states and regions have 
already moved forward toward their own climate change 
initiatives.80  Realistically, it will take years for the EPA to 
effectively regulate greenhouse gases resulting from vehicular 
and stationary sources.  The timeframes involved in that federal 
regulatory endeavor do not even include the time necessary to 
resolve the inevitable litigation that will arise as a result of the 
regulatory efforts.  It has been more than a decade since the 
Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997.  Meanwhile, in the shadow 
of the vacuum resulting from the federal government’s inaction 
in regulating greenhouse gas emissions to date, state and local 
governments will continue in their initiatives to adopt climate 
change programs on their own. 
III 
EXISTING REGIONAL AND STATE CLIMATE PROTECTION 
EFFORTS EVOLVING FROM THE VACUUM 
In the absence of a comprehensive federal program to address 
climate change in the years since the Kyoto Protocol and leading 
up to Massachusetts, many states and regions have pursued 
global warming initiatives on their own.  Some states have set 
targets for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, adopted 
programs to promote renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
and developed statewide action plans.  On the regional level, 
states have organized in collaborative efforts to establish 
emission-trading programs and promote clean energy 
development. 
Among noteworthy climate change programs, the Northeast 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was established in 
2005 by seven northeastern and mid-Atlantic states who agreed 
to a cap-and-trade system aimed at reducing carbon dioxide 
 
80 See, e.g., RGGI, supra note 18. 
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emissions from power plants in the region.81  Meanwhile, the 
Western Governors’ Association, which consists of the 
governors of nineteen states and three U.S.-flag Pacific Islands, 
developed the Clean and Diversified Energy Initiative to 
promote a set of strategies to increase energy efficiency, expand 
the use of renewable energy sources in the region, and 
incentivize carbon capture and sequestration.82  In 2006, the 
governors of Arizona and New Mexico executed an agreement 
to create the Southwest Climate Change Initiative, through 
which the two states agreed to collaborate to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and address the impacts of climate change in the 
southwest.83  In 2004, the governors of Washington, Oregon, and 
California approved a series of detailed recommendations to 
reduce global warming pollution through the West Coast 
Governors’ Global Warming Initiative.84  Among other things, 
the initiative included the adoption of comprehensive state and 
regional goals for reducing emissions and expanding markets for 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and alternative fuels.85 
Earlier efforts toward regional collaboration also include the 
New England Governors’ and Eastern Canadian Premiers 
(NEG-ECP) Climate Action Plan, which includes short- and 
long-term goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the 
region.86 Similarly, the Powering the Plains initiative includes 
participants from the Dakotas, Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, and 
the Canadian province of Manitoba and aims to develop 
strategies, policies, and demonstration projects for alternative 
 
81 RGGI, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 
2008).  The state parties to the RGGI are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont.  RGGI, Participating States, 
http://www.rggi.org/states.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). 
82 Western Governors’ Association: Clean and Diversified Energy Initiative–
CDEi, http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/cdeac/index.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 
2008). 
83 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change–State and Local Governments, 
State and Regional Climate Actions Table, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
wycd/stateandlocalgov/state_actionslist.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
84 West Coast Governors’ Global Warming Initiative, http://www.ef.org/ 
westcoastclimate/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 
85 Id. 
86 See NEW ENGLAND GOVERNORS/EASTERN CANADIAN PREMIERS, CLIMATE 
CHANGE ACTION PLAN 2001, available at http://www.negc.org/documents/NEG-
ECP%20CCAP.PDF. 
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energy sources.87  Most recently, the states of Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Canadian 
province of Manitoba established the Midwestern Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, which will establish 
regional greenhouse gas reduction targets and develop a multi-
sector cap-and-trade system to help meet the targets.88 
Beyond the regional efforts addressing climate change in the 
federal vacuum, many states are pursuing aggressive climate 
change programs.  Notably, the State of California is at the 
forefront of state efforts.  Although there are other states that 
have aggressively pursued greenhouse gas initiatives, the authors 
will focus on California’s unique initiatives to illustrate the 
laboratory from which the federal government should both 
foster and draw from in the implementation of national, 
economy-wide climate change policies. 
IV 
CALIFORNIA: A LABORATORY FOR EFFECTIVE AIR 
POLLUTION REGULATION 
California has long been a model for effective and aggressive 
air pollution regulation.  Even before the adoption of vehicle 
emission controls at the federal level, California had already 
made pioneering efforts to control mobile sources of air 
pollution to resolve California’s particularly severe air pollution 
problems.89  As a result, Congress adopted section 209(b) of the 
CAA, which recognized California’s pre-existing emission 
controls and authorized a potential exemption for additional 
emission controls that could be stricter than federal standards.90  
Section 209(b)(1) provides in part as follows: 
 
87 Great Plains Institute, Powering the Plains, http://www.gpisd.net/ 
resource.html?Id=61 (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 
88 See MIDWESTERN GOVERNORS ASS’N, MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS 
ACCORD 2007 (2007), available at http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/resolutions/ 
GHGAccord.pdf. 
89 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Air Pollution Control Orientation Course, 
Origins of Modern Air Pollution Regulations, http://www.epa.gov/apti/course422/ 
apc1.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (“In the 1940s, air pollution received greater 
attention in the United States when smog was noticed in Los Angeles . . . .  
California passed the first state air pollution law in 1947, and the first National Air 
Pollution Symposium in the United States was held in 1949.”). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006). 
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The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for 
public hearing, waive application of this section to any State 
which has adopted standards . . . for the control of emissions 
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to 
March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the State standards 
will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health 
and welfare as applicable Federal standards.91 
Because California was the only state to have adopted vehicle 
emission standards prior to March 30, 1966, section 209(b)(1) 
effectively applies only to California.  In other words, there can 
never be more than two sets of vehicle emission standards: 
EPA’s or California’s.  However, once the EPA grants a waiver 
to California, other states are permitted to adopt California’s 
regulations as part of their own air pollution control programs or 
Statewide Transportation Improvement Programs (STIPS).92 
California’s regulatory process for air pollution is established 
by state statute,93 with the regulatory process essentially 
consisting of a two-tier administrative approach.  At the first tier, 
the state Air Resources Board (ARB) is designated as 
California’s statewide air pollution regulatory agency.94  The 
ARB has several major areas of responsibility for California’s air 
pollution control activities, specifically including the authority 
for the control of vehicular sources of air pollution.95  The ARB 
is also designated as the air pollution control agency for all 
purposes set forth in federal law, and is the state agency 
responsible for preparation of the state implementation plan 
required by the CAA.96  In addition, the ARB is empowered to 
promulgate rules and regulations,97 is directed to divide the state 
into air basins, and adopt ambient air quality standards.98 
At the second tier and in addition to the ARB, California’s 
statutory framework also created local and regional authorities 
to implement the state’s air pollution control program.  The local 
and regional authorities (county, unified, and regional air 
 
91 Id. 
92 Id. § 7507. 
93 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000–44474 (2006). 
94 Id. § 39510. 
95 Id. §§ 39002, 40000. 
96 Id. § 39602. 
97 Id. §§ 39600, 39601(a). 
98 Id. § 39606. 
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pollution control districts) implement the primary responsibility 
for control of air pollution from all sources other than vehicular 
and consumer products, i.e., stationary sources.99  The various air 
districts are authorized to adopt and enforce rules and 
regulations to achieve and maintain the state and federal 
ambient air quality standards.100  Districts also have the general 
authority to perform acts necessary or proper to execute their 
powers and duties, including the power to sue or be sued.101  
Significantly, California air districts also have the power to 
“establish additional, stricter standards than those set forth by 
law or by the state board for nonvehicular sources.”102  A 
thorough analysis of the complex air pollution control system 
established by the California Clean Air Act is beyond the scope 
of this Article.103  However, California’s extensive air regulatory 
program underscores why and how state and regional initiatives 
to address climate change have begun to flourish in the federal 
vacuum. 
California’s proactive and aggressive commitment to 
environmental issues, as evidenced by its air pollution regulatory 
program, is reflected in its leadership in recent years, particularly 
in the context of climate change initiatives.  For example, 
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger issued Executive 
Order S-3-05 on June 1, 2005, which established greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets for California; ordered the Secretary 
of the California Environmental Protection Agency to 
coordinate oversight of the efforts needed to meet the targets 
with the Secretary of the Business, Transportation and Housing 
Agency, Secretary of the Department of Food and Agriculture, 
Secretary of the Resources Agency, Chairperson of the Air 
Resources Board, Chairperson of the Energy Commission, and 
the President of the Public Utilities Commission.104  In addition, 
the Executive Order requires the Secretary of the California 
 
99 Id. §§ 39002, 40000. 
100 Id. § 40001. 
101 Id. §§ 40701, 40702. 
102 Id. § 41508. 
103 For an overview and analysis of California’s air regulatory program, see 
Federal Requirements and the Goals and Structure of California’s Air Regulatory 
Program, in DAVID NAWI ET AL., CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & LAND 
USE PRACTICE § 40 (2008). 
104 Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (June 1, 2005). 
 58 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 23, 35 
Environmental Protection Agency to report to the Governor 
and the State Legislature biannually on progress made toward 
meeting the greenhouse gas-reduction targets and on the impacts 
to California from climate change, including mitigation and 
adaptation strategies to combat those impacts.105 
Governor Schwarzenegger’s leadership in the area of climate 
change extends beyond policy direction into the realm of 
aggressive environmental litigation.  Within days of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Massachusetts, the Governor sent a notice of 
intent to the Administrator of the EPA notifying it of 
California’s intent to sue if the federal government fails to act on 
California’s request for a waiver to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions in light of the Supreme Court’s determination in 
Massachusetts.106  The purpose of the waiver request was to 
enable California to implement Assembly Bill 1493, which 
directed the California ARB to “develop and adopt regulations 
that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.”107  True to his 
word, on November 8, 2007, the Governor and California 
Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr. filed an action against 
the EPA in the United States District Court, District of 
Columbia Circuit, seeking to compel action to approve 
California’s waiver request.108  In December 2007, the EPA 
Administrator issued a decision denying the waiver request.109  
 
105 Id. 
106 Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Warns U.S. 
EPA of California’s Intent to Sue if Federal Government Fails to Act on Waiver to 
Reduce Emissions (Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-
release/6031/. 
107 Assem. B. 1493, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(a) (Cal. 2002) (codified at CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42823, 43018.5 (2006)). 
108 California v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 3, 
2008).  In a letter to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson, House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi wrote, “The actions of the EPA in denying the California request cannot help 
but raise serious questions about the support of the Bush administration for state 
efforts to safeguard the environment and the health of their residents.”  Ken 
Thomas, Pelosi: Congress to Scrutinize EPA Rejection of California Clean Air 
Standards, N. COUNTY TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, 
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/12/22/news/state/10_22_1812_21_07.txt. 
109 California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of 
Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and 
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor 
Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
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Consequently, the litigation over California’s waiver request to 
implement Assembly Bill 1493 is pending in the federal courts 
and has been joined by other states. 
The California Legislature has also been remarkably proactive 
in the federal vacuum of comprehensive national climate change 
programs.110  The most significant and far-reaching California 
legislation to date addressing climate change is Assembly Bill 32, 
enacted in 2006 as the “California Global Warming Solutions 
Act of 2006.”111  The Act establishes a comprehensive program of 
regulatory and market mechanisms to achieve real, quantifiable, 
and cost-effective reductions of greenhouse gases.  The 
legislation designates the California Air Resources Board as the 
agency responsible for monitoring and reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and authorizes the governor to invoke a “safety valve” 
for up to twelve months at a time in the event of extraordinary 
circumstances, catastrophic events, or the threat of significant 
economic harm.112 
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 
32) mandates a comprehensive program that requires the ARB 
to implement the following: 
(1) establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions cap for 
  2020, based on 1990 emissions by January 1, 2008;113 
(2) adopt mandatory reporting rules for significant sources of 
  greenhouse gases by January 1, 2008;114 
(3) adopt a plan by January 1, 2009, which indicates how 
  emission reductions will be achieved from significant 
  greenhouse gas sources through regulations, market 
  mechanisms, and other actions;115 
 
110 See, e.g., Assem. B. 1493, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002)  (requiring 
reductions in vehicular emissions of greenhouse gases from cars and light-duty 
trucks sold in California); S.B. 812, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (making 
amendments to the California Climate Action Registry, including the requirement 
that the Registry adopt procedures and protocols for the reporting and certification 
of greenhouse gas emission reductions); S.B. 527, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) 
(providing for, among other things, revisions of the functions and duties of the 
California Climate Action Registry); S.B. 1771, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) 
(requiring, among other things, the establishment of a California Climate Action 
Registry to record and register voluntary greenhouse gas emission reductions made 
by California entities after 1990). 
111 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (2006). 
112 Id. § 38599. 
113 Id. § 38550. 
114 Id. § 38530. 
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(4) adopt regulations by January 1, 2011, to achieve the  
  maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective 
  reductions in greenhouse gases, including provisions for 
  using both market mechanisms and alternative compliance 
  mechanisms;116 
(5) convene an Environmental Justice Advisory Committee  
  and an Economic and Technology Advancement 
  Committee to advise ARB;117 
(6) ensure public notice and opportunity for comment on all  
  ARB actions;118 
(7) prior to imposing mandates or authorizing market  
  mechanisms, requires ARB to evaluate several factors, 
  including but not limited to: impacts on California’s 
  economy, the environment, and public health; equity 
  between regulated entities; electricity reliability, 
  conformance with other environmental laws, and 
  “environmental justice” determinations to assure that the 
  rules do not disproportionally impact low-income 
  communities;119 and 
(8) adopt a list of discrete, early action measures by July 1, 
  2007, that can be implemented and adopted before 
  January 1, 2010.120 
Since the enactment of AB 32, the California ARB has moved 
aggressively to implement the Act, arguably the most ambitious 
climate protection program in the nation.  On October 17, 2007, 
ARB adopted its Early Actions to Mitigate Climate Change in 
California.121  The early action plan identified nine discrete 
measures where enforceable regulations could be adopted and 
implemented by 2010 to reduce approximately 16 million tons of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, involving various areas, 
including transportation, waste, agriculture, commercial, 
education, electricity, energy efficiency, fire suppression, 
forestry, oil and gas capture, reducing chlorofluorocarbons from 
 
115 Id. § 38561. 
116 Id. § 38562. 
117 Id. § 38591. 
118 Id. § 38550. 
119 Id. § 38591. 
120 Id. § 38560. 
121 AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROPOSED EARLY ACTIONS TO 
MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA (2007), available at 
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/2007-04-20_ARB 
_early_action_report.pdf. 
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refrigeration systems, and tire inflation standards, among 
others.122 
On December 7, 2007, the ARB adopted its Mandatory 
Reporting regulation specifying the requirements and protocols 
for affected sources to track and report their greenhouse gas 
emissions each year.123  At the same hearing, the ARB approved 
the 1990 baseline emissions inventory that defines the target 
greenhouse gas emissions level to be reached by 2020.124  The 
emission levels were developed through an extensive public 
process, including technical workshops.  In addition, the Scoping 
Plan that will define the regulatory and market-based GHG 
reduction measures to be implemented to meet the 2020 
emission target is under development and currently in the public 
input phase.125  Although a comprehensive discussion of 
California’s initiatives to address climate change and global 
warming solutions is beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
nevertheless clear that California is making significant progress 
toward addressing climate change at a time when the federal 
government is still reacting to the implications of Massachusetts. 
Beyond the legislative arena and California’s regulatory 
efforts to address climate change, the climate change issue has 
emerged in other areas of California law, including land use 
planning, transportation planning, and environmental law.  Most 
notably, the California Attorney General has relied on 
provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act 
(CEQA)126 to assert that land use planning decisions and 
development projects subject to CEQA are required to address, 
quantify, and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.  For example, 
the Attorney General has begun to routinely comment on 
various projects subject to CEQA, including the Conoco-Phillips 
Rodeo Refinery Expansion Project,127 the Orange County 
 
122 Id. at 12–17. 
123 AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF BOARD 
MEETING DECEMBER 6 & 7, 2007, at 3–5 (2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
board/ms/2007/ms120607.pdf. 
124 Id. at 5–7. 
125 See AIR RES. BD., supra note 121. 
126 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.4 (2006). 
127 Letter from Bill Lockyear, Cal. Att’y Gen., to Glenn Campbell, Principal 
Transp. Analyst, Orange County Transp. Auth. (Mar. 30, 2006) (on file with 
authors). 
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Transportation Authority’s 2006 Long-Range Transportation 
Plan Draft Program,128 and the Coyote Valley Specific Plan 
involving a proposed new development community of 80,000 
people in an existing rural area near the city of San Jose, 
California.129 
Significantly, the California Attorney General recently settled 
a climate change lawsuit filed against the County of San 
Bernardino in April 2007 in connection with the County’s 
update to its General Plan.130  In the case, the Attorney General 
alleged that San Bernardino County’s General Plan update 
failed to quantify and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and 
failed to explain how population growth predicted under the 
General Plan would impact the State’s ability to obtain the 
greenhouse gas-reduction targets mandated by the California 
Climate Change Solutions Act (AB 32).131  Ultimately, the State 
and San Bernardino County reached a settlement which requires 
the County to inventory and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with its land use planning decisions.132 
In other arenas, there are currently pending a number of 
CEQA lawsuits in California superior courts brought by non-
profit groups challenging the adequacy of climate change 
analysis for private development projects.133  Such CEQA 
 
128 Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Cal. Att’y Gen., to Maureen Parkes, 
Contra Costa County Planning Comm’n, (May 8, 2007) (on file with authors). 
129 Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Cal. Att’y Gen., to Jared Hart et al., City 
of San Jose (June 19, 2007) (on file with authors).  Copies of these letters are 
available through the Attorney General’s office and the local agency recipients 
pursuant to the California Public Records Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6250–6270 
(2006). 
130 California’s land use laws require municipalities and counties to adopt 
comprehensive, long-term plans to guide development and growth.  These “general 
plans” are required to address a number of elements, including land use, 
transportation, housing, and conservation.  See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65300 (2006). 
131 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (2006); see also State v. 
County of San Bernardino, No. CIVSS-0700329, at 2–3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 
2007) (order regarding settlement), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/ 
press/pdfs/2007-08-21_San_Bernardino_settlement_agreement.pdf. 
132 County of San Bernardino, No. CIVSS-0700329, at 2–3. 
133 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. City of Desert Hot Springs, No. RIC464585 
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 24, 2007) (challenging an Environmental Impact Report 
(EIR) for a 2700-unit residential/commercial development); Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. City of Banning, No. RIC460967 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 21, 2006) 
(challenging an EIR for a 1500-unit residential development); Ctr. for Biological  
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challenges, especially in the context of climate change, are 
particularly vexing in the absence of clear standards derived 
from comprehensive climate change regulatory programs.  Such 
programs are necessary to enable decision makers to determine 
the thresholds for ascertaining significant adverse environmental 
impacts and potential mitigation measures for those impacts 
resulting from projects under CEQA. 
In January, 2008, the California Air Pollution Control Officers 
Association (CAPCOA) published a “white paper” addressing 
greenhouse gas emissions from projects subject to CEQA.134  
Reflecting the collective work of the California air districts, the 
white paper is intended as a resource guide for local 
governments who are grappling with the vexing problem of how 
precisely to evaluate GHG at a time of considerable flux, while 
establishing the “threshold limits” essential to analyzing the 
environmental impacts associated with GHG.135  The paper 
represents the first comprehensive effort in California in the 
area of CEQA to provide “an organized review of available 
tools and models for evaluating GHG emissions, and an 
overview of strategies for mitigating potentially significant GHG 
emissions from projects.”136  Although CAPCOA modestly 
cautions in the cover letter accompanying the release of the 
 
Diversity v. San Bernardino County, No. SCVSS-133424 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 
15, 2005) (challenging a permit for a commercial compost facility). 
134  Governor’s Office of Planning & Research Climate Change & CEQA:  
Presentation to the Climate Action Team (2007), available at 
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/documents/2007-09-19_OPR_PRESENTATION 
.PDF. 
135 CEQA does not necessarily require that agencies establish thresholds of 
significance, although such thresholds are logically necessary to determining the 
significance of particular environmental effects.  The CEQA regulatory guidelines 
provide that: 
Each public agency is encouraged to develop and publish thresholds of 
significance that the agency uses in the determination of the significance of 
environmental effects.  A threshold of significance is an identifiable 
quantitative, qualitative or performance level of a particular environmental 
effect, non-compliance with which means the effect will normally be 
determined to be significant by the agency and compliance with which 
normally means the effect will be determined to be less than significant. 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.7(a) (2007). 
136 Cover Letter from Douglas Quetin, President, Cal. Air Pollution Control 
Officer’s Ass’n, to Interested Parties (Jan. 2, 2008), available at 
http://www.capcoa.org/ceqa/?docID=coverletter. 
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paper that it is “not a guidance document,” the CAPCOA  
“resource guide” will no doubt be cited and debated in future 
projects and litigation, at least in California, into the near 
future.137 
The issue of greenhouse gases in the context of the 
environmental review process has even emerged on the federal 
level in Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.138  In that case, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals required the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) to prepare an environmental impact 
statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Protection 
Act (NEPA) to address CO2 as a greenhouse gas in a rulemaking 
context.139 
California’s commitment to climate change initiatives, in the 
absence of comprehensive federal programs, will no doubt 
continue to proliferate across the board in executive policy, 
legislation, administrative rulemaking, and local governmental 
decision making in the context of land use and other areas of 
environmental law.  The extent of that commitment was perhaps 
best articulated by the California Attorney General’s challenge 
to California counties to combat climate change at the 113th 
annual meeting of the California State Association of Counties.  
Addressing the county supervisors and other public officials 
representing California’s fifty-eight counties, Attorney General 
Brown stated: 
California is committed to cutting greenhouse gas emissions 
back to 1990 levels.  This radical change in our fossil fuel 
economy demands imagination, massive investment and 
extraordinary ingenuity.  The counties should immediately 
lead the charge against climate disruption and combat global 
 
137 Id. 
138 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 
508 (9th Cir. 2007). 
139 Id. at 554. Similarly, in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstene, the court 
held that both EPA and California, through the waiver process of CAA section 209, 
are equally empowered to promulgate regulations that limit the emission of 
greenhouse gases, principally carbon dioxide, from motor vehicles.  529 F. Supp. 2d 
1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).  The court further held that the promulgation of such 
regulations does not interfere or conflict with NHTSA’s duty to set maximum 
feasible average mileage standards.  Id. at 1161. 
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warming through green buildings, alternative energy and wise 
land use rules.140 
V 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONFLICTS OVER CLIMATE-CHANGE 
INITIATIVES 
As California and other states continue to develop and 
implement climate change programs, the inherent tension in our 
nation’s particular form of federalism will necessitate 
compromise and coordination between the federal and state 
jurisdictions.  At the heart of the issue of federalism is the 
argument over the perceived political advantages and 
disadvantages inherent in decentralized environmental decision 
making, as compared to centralized environmental decision 
making. 
The bases for the arguments for decentralized environmental 
decision making include the states’ right to determine 
environmental protection measures based upon a balance 
between environmental protection and economic development; 
the potential for a greater range of environmental choices based 
upon local circumstances; the inherent differences between 
states in their natural and impacted environments and potential 
efficiencies resulting from the unique circumstances applicable 
to certain environmental measures; and the view that states are 
more nimble and can provide technological and regulatory 
innovation more flexibly than the federal government.141 
The bases for the arguments regarding centralized 
environmental decision making include concerns that states may 
adopt less stringent standards; inconsistent state actions may 
result in interstate and possibly even foreign policy impacts; 
centralized environmental decision making may be more 
efficient in terms of both research and development of 
regulatory standards and their effect on nationwide or multi-
national industries; and, specific to climate change, its global 
 
140 Press Release, Cal. Office of the Att’y Gen., Brown Challenges Counties to 
Combat Climate Change (Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms 
_attachments/press/pdfs/n1495_brownchallengescounties.pdf. 
141 Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role 
for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 61–65 (2007). 
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consequences cannot be effectively addressed at the state and 
local level.142 
Beyond the policy choices inherent to federalism in the 
context of climate change initiatives, state and regional-level 
approaches to regulating greenhouse gases will likely raise 
broader constitutional concerns.  The federal government has 
yet to comprehensively occupy the field of climate change 
initiatives, except arguably with regard to vehicular fuels under 
CAA section 202143 and yet-to-be developed EPA regulations 
after Massachusetts.  Thus, states are free to continue 
implementing their own regulatory climate change initiatives, 
including some that may ultimately be inconsistent with the 
efforts of the federal government and other states, until the 
federal government effectively occupies that field.  As previously 
mentioned, California’s Clean Air Act provides that even local 
and regional air authorities “may establish additional, stricter 
standards than those set forth by law or by the state board for 
nonvehicular sources.”144 
Depending on how the federal government ultimately 
responds to climate change after Massachusetts, future 
comprehensive regulatory approaches addressing climate change 
may turn on questions of federal supremacy.  The Supremacy 
Clause under the United States Constitution essentially 
invalidates state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to” 
federal law.145  Federal law can supersede state law through: (1) 
express preemption, i.e., where Congress preempts state law in 
express terms;146 (2) nullification of a state law to the extent that 
it actually conflicts with federal law;147 and (3) implied 
preemption, i.e., where the federal regulatory scheme “is 
 
142 For a comprehensive analysis of the federalism considerations, see id. 
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006). 
144 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41508 (2006). 
145 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 103 (1824); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
146 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
147 Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 
(1985). 
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sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state 
regulation.”148  At this juncture, Congress has not expressly 
preempted state action regarding climate change initiatives, 
except, perhaps, in the context of limited areas like vehicular 
fuels.  Further, in the absence of comprehensive federal 
legislation addressing climate change, the states’ initiatives, both 
regulatory and voluntary, are not yet conflicting with federal 
law.  Finally, until the federal government acts definitively and 
comprehensively, implied preemption will be limited to those 
areas where Congress has actually left no room for 
supplementary state regulation. 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is 
another potential obstacle to state and regional climate change 
initiatives.  The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”149  In the context of 
greenhouse gas regulations, the Commerce Clause issue is more 
appropriately viewed in terms of the so-called Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  The concept is based on the premise that, 
since the Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power 
to enact legislation that affects interstate commerce, the 
converse is also true; an implicit restriction prohibiting a state 
from passing legislation that improperly burdens or 
discriminates against interstate commerce.150  Consequently, in 
the absence of a Congressional exercise of power derived from 
the Commerce Clause, there exists an implied presumption to 
the effect that states lack authority to regulate commerce in a 
manner that either discriminates against interstate commerce or 
unduly burdens interstate commerce.151  Discrimination against 
interstate commerce may occur where a state law treats 
interstate businesses, buyers, sellers, or persons 
disadvantageously as compared to in-state interests.152  It can be 
anticipated that the Dormant Commerce Clause argument will 
be raised in the context of climate change, especially with regard 
 
148 Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
149 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
150 City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978). 
151 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). 
152 City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 621. 
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to industries active in interstate markets, particularly energy 
production, oil refining, transportation, and similar industries.153 
Yet another potential obstacle to state and regional climate 
change initiatives is the Foreign Affairs Power, which arises from 
the President’s fundamental executive powers and from certain 
powers granted to Congress, i.e., the power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations.154  Although the U.S. 
Constitution “expressly grants Congress, not the President, the 
power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” the 
President has broad authority with regard to foreign policy.155  
Generally, federal foreign policy preempts state action, 
particularly where there is a conflict between federal and state 
law policies.156  It is at least conceivable that state and regional 
climate change initiatives could trigger foreign policy 
implications, for example, in the context of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).157  Some might assert that it is 
at least arguable that the President has pursued some form of 
foreign policy on climate change, albeit limited essentially to 
voluntary initiatives.  For now, the failure of the United States to 
join the Kyoto Protocol and the Supreme Court’s skepticism of 
EPA’s “foreign policy” arguments in Massachusetts suggest that 
the foreign affairs-power argument currently has minimal 
 
153 In the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause issue raised by climate 
change initiatives, it is somewhat ironic that Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia 
and Clarence Thomas, both part of the dissent in the Court’s opinion, have rejected 
the notion of a Dormant Commerce Clause in other contexts.  See, e.g., United 
Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786 
(2007); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). 
154 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
155 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
156 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
157 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 
Stat. 2057.  NAFTA is an international treaty between the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico, to eliminate the majority of tariffs on products traded between those 
nations, and gradually phase out other tariffs over a ten-year period.  Id. art. 302.  It 
includes the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC), which is intended to be a mechanism for addressing trade and 
environmental issues.  See North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, U.S.-Mex.-Can, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; see also Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, North American FTA, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/Section_Index.html (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
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viability unless the Administration or Congress act more 
decisively.158 
Federalism issues aside, the fundamental question 
policymakers need to resolve is whether it is more appropriate 
for the states to act now in the area of climate change, or 
whether the field should be simply left to the federal government 
to address in its own time.  The reality is that the wheels of state 
action are in motion and, in view of the perceived immediacy of 
the climate change problem, some action is seemingly preferable 
to no action.  California, in particular, with its far-reaching 
climate control programs mandated by AB 32 discussed above, is 
in a unique position to serve as a laboratory for truly meaningful 
global warming solutions. 
The regulatory options being considered by California and 
other states may be the best vehicles for reconciling the 
numerous competing interests in designing and implementing 
climate change initiatives.  As shown by California, the states are 
more nimble and have a high level of expertise regarding the 
sources under their control.  Moreover, the fact that climate 
change is a global problem does not minimize the relevance of 
state efforts to address the problem.  The states have special 
economic justifications for pursuing climate change matters, 
especially to the extent that climate change may impact their 
citizens directly.  For example, a report issued by the California 
Climate Change Center at the University of California, 
Berkeley, indicates that although California’s environment and 
economy are vulnerable to climate impacts, pursuing climate 
change initiatives could actually boost California’s annual Gross 
State Product (GSP) by $60-74 billion and create 17,000 to 
89,000 new jobs.159  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts in the context of Massachusetts’ standing is 
especially pertinent to the importance of state initiatives in that 
regard.  The Court recognized that “EPA’s steadfast refusal to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to 
Massachusetts that is both actual and imminent.”160  
 
158 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462–63 (2007). 
159 DAVID ROLAND-HOLST, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GREENHOUSE GAS 
MITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA 3 (2006), available at http://calclimate.berkeley.edu/ 
Growth_Strategies_Full_Report.pdf. 
160 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 (internal quotations omitted). 
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Consequently, the states have a right to protect their interests in 
terms of climate change and its effects on those interests. 
In the final analysis, the issue is not simply a choice between 
federal and state approaches to address climate change, but 
rather, whether federal and state approaches can be harmonized 
to complement each other.  Most modern federal environmental 
laws contemplate concurrent federal and state roles.  The 
relationship between the federal and state standards with regard 
to air pollution under the CAA was discussed above.161  In view 
of the importance and immediacy of the climate change 
problem, and especially in view of the significant state and 
regional efforts that have occurred to date, it is neither necessary 
nor wise for federal law to completely preempt and prevent state 
and regional initiatives addressing climate change.  While the 
global nature of the issue argues for a more uniform approach to 
its resolution, ultimately, a well-conceived federal and state 
“federalist” program that incorporates coordination of the 
programs that work best and preempts those that either do not 
work or are better handled on a national level, is our most viable 
approach for effectively and expeditiously addressing climate 
change in our time.162 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Although an understanding of Massachusetts may be limited 
to what it says about standing or EPA’s obligation to conduct 
rulemaking with regard to greenhouse gases resulting from 
vehicular sources, the ultimate impact of the case is much 
greater.  The Supreme Court recognized that CO2 constitutes an 
air pollutant in the context of climate change.  That ruling forced 
an environmental dialogue which provided a catalyst for 
potential federal, regional, state, and local initiatives for 
regulating and addressing the adverse impacts of greenhouse 
gases. 
 
161 With regard to other environmental laws, see for example, Robert L. 
Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of 
Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737–47 (2006) 
(providing detailed analysis of federal and state responsibilities in various 
environmental statutes). 
162 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006). 
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California’s pioneering efforts, as well as other regional and 
state efforts in the area of climate change, should be regarded as 
models for truly meaningful greenhouse gas initiatives.  After all, 
California has progressively and effectively dealt with air 
pollution for decades and has sophisticated regulatory programs 
in place, supported by a high level of administrative and 
scientific expertise.  States and local air agencies can provide 
critical support to future federal programs, particularly with 
regard to implementing and enforcing federal requirements on 
stationary sources.  Consequently, the states and regions should 
be regarded as a laboratory for a broader federal solution based 
upon selective coordination and preemption with regard to those 
climate change programs that work, as well as those that do not. 
Until preempted, the states and regions will, and indeed 
should, continue their efforts to address climate change within 
their means.  With the potential Supremacy and Dormant 
Commerce Clause issues in mind, states and regions should 
design their global warming programs with an eye towards 
avoiding the obvious potential legal issues and obstacles, and in 
the future, states should be as consistent as possible with the 
science and potential tenets of a broader federal policy to be 
truly part of a global solution.  The time to pursue a new 
environmental federalism to address the unprecedented threat 
of climate change is now.  The methods, systems, and 
infrastructure for implementing solutions are already in place or 
under development, but their effectiveness depends on mutual 
agreement, coordination, and cooperation. 
Meaningful solutions for resolving the climate change issue 
will take time, yet the prevailing science on the subject indicates 
we may no longer have that luxury.  If the almost-daily reports in 
the press regarding melting glaciers, rising sea levels, threatened 
extinction of polar bears and other species, widespread drought, 
extreme weather events and other potential effects of climate 
change are any indicator of the seriousness of this issue, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to believe that we are not simply 
running out of time.  To the extent that the states are more 
nimble and, to a significant degree, have proven more proactive 
than the federal government with regard to the urgent need for 
meaningful climate change initiatives, they can and should take 
the lead in a broader national program to address climate change 
until the federal government responds.  Hopefully, Congress and 
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the Administration will ultimately show the wisdom and courage 
needed to implement a broader and more comprehensive 
“global” approach to climate protection that incorporates and 
embraces the best and most effective of the evolving state and 
regional programs. 
More than a decade after the Kyoto Protocol, whose 
signatories include more than 170 countries, generating more 
than sixty percent of total global greenhouse gas emissions, the 
United States has yet to ratify the treaty.163  The political 
rationale behind that decision is still under debate, but the fact 
remains: If not for the actions taken by states and regional 
coalitions, we would have very little to show with regard to our 
country’s efforts to address climate change. 
Given the United States’ highly visible standing as one of the 
major  emitters of greenhouse gases on the planet, our failure to 
take responsible action as a nation has contributed significantly 
to a corresponding lack of action by other important countries 
and resulted in a rapid acceleration in the severity of the 
problem.  Solutions are now more difficult to achieve than they 
were a decade ago, and the time for implementing them is 
quickly diminishing.  Responsive and substantive action is 
needed on a large scale, which is precisely the case for a 
cooperative federal and state partnership.  The United States 
needs to embrace a new environmental federalism and resume 
its role as a world leader on this issue.  Once that happens, other 
nations will follow.  Only then will we begin moving toward a 
truly meaningful global solution, which we now need more 
urgently than ever. 
 
 
163 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?group 
=kyoto (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
